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FOREWORD
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief

of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of
professional interest to officers of the naval service.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are
those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy

Department or of the Naval War College.
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NOTES ON THE TERM STRATEGY
A lecture

delivered

by

Professor Edward Mead Earle
at the Naval War College
At!gust 22, 1949

Admiral Beary and Gentlemen of the Naval War College:
I ought to say first of all that I am particularly delighted

to be here. This is my first appearance at the NavalWar College;
That is not due to any lack of appreciation on my part of the Navy
or sea power, but rather to the circumstances which from time to
time have prevented rile from accepting previous invitations. So
that, although this is the first actual appearance, I have a feeling

of warmaffectionforthe College and for the things with which you

are concerned.

.

.

.

I have chosen. this topic of "Notes on the Term Strategy,"

because, as has been said in the introduction, the term is one which

is used in a very great variety of ways, with a great many different
meanings, and not always with great exactitude. The term cannot,

in the nature of things, be defined with great exactitude, and it cer
tainly is not my purpose to give it a definitive and hide-bound
definition this morning. What I prefer to do is to throw out a few

ideas that are suggested by the word and to point particularly to
some of the non-military phases of strategy which have become
increasingly more significant in the last fifty years than they had
theretofore been.

The very word strategy came into use in the English

language only toward the end of' the eighteenth century-some
where after 1763, the end of the Seven Years' War. That in itProfessor Earle is a Professor, School of Economics and Politics;
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University. He is the co'
Military Thought
author and. editor of Makers of Modern Strategy:
.
.
·
from Michiav-elli to Hitler. ·
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self is significant, I might say, as I'll point out presently. The
word is of Greek derivation coming from the Greek "strategos" or
"strategus". This "Strategus" was first a general officer. He was

an officer of the military forces and in many cases in· Greece he
was also the chief political officer of the government. It was true

in Athens, it was true in the Achean league, that the "Strategus"
was not only commander of forces in the field, but he was also
the Chief Magistrate or whatever other designation the principal
political office of the government happened to be. That idea· was
carried over into the constitution of the United States, in which

the President of the United States was made Commander in Chief
of all the Armed Forces of the United States. In actual practice

in most states, always in time of war, and more frequently than
not in time of peace, the chief political officer of the government
is also the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. It is usual
in France-not always necessarily true, but usually true-that the

Prime Minister may be the Minister of Defense ; and it frequent
ly has been true in Britain that such is the case as well.
In most of the Utopian literature of the eighteenth century,
which influenced a good deal of the American political thought

which entered into the constitution, the same thing was true
that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces was the same
person as the principal political officer of the government. So that,

even in the very literal meaning of the word "strategy," there is
an implication that it has political as well as military connotations,
associations and implications.

I said that the word did not come into very general use
until the late eighteenth century. And the reason was that it was

not until the eighteenth century that there was much point in dif
ferentiating between tactics and strategy. "Tactics" was the word

in very general use before the word "strategy". But as war be
came somewhat more complicated in its character, for a variety of

2
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;reasons, and finally when war involved the· very existence of a
nation in arms with a revolutionary philosophy, as in the case of

the French Revolution, it was clear that you had tq have a concept
which concerned the handling of all the military resources of the
nation and 'which was not confined merely to what went on in the
actual battlefield.

So long as the very idea of strategy involved

simply a certain number of "ruses de guerre'' and devices for fooling

the enemy as to the disposition of your troops, there wasn't enough
difference between strategy and tactics to necessitate a real differ

entiation in definition. In the first World War, but more particular
ly in the last war, it was true that the Commander in Chief of the

Armed Forces, the principal political agent of the government,

played a conspicuous role in the actual conduct of the war. For ex

ample, I suppose Franklin Roosevelt was more keenly aware of his
job of being Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces than any

other

man

who

ever

occupied

the White House.

Certainly

Winston Churchill, more than any Prime· Minister before him,

felt the keenness of his responsibility for making critical decisions
in connection with the conduct of the war.

The instance of Hitler

is so obvious as to need no comment, and it is significant that

Stalin eventually made himself Generalissimo of the Armed Forces

of the Soviet Union as well as Chief of the Soviet State.

Lincoln

is an instl:\nce of a President who didn't quite know whether he was
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces primarily, or was Presi

dent of the United States primarily, with the result that under

Lincoln we had a good deal of bungling in the conduct of military
operations (a fact with which you are so familiar as to require

no further comment).

As I understand it, the definition in the Navy of the word

"strategy" varies at different echelons of command: that the

strategy to be pursued, we'll say, by the officer commanding a

:fleet of destroyers would be one thing; the strategy of a man in com-

3
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r,nand of a fleet would be another; the strategy of a m,an in com'.'.
mand of all the naval forces in .an area like the Pacific would be

still something else; the strategy of a chief of naval operations
would be on a still different level. And. then on the top of all this
apex is the President of the United States who, after all, has tlle
final say.-

_Not only does the definition of strategy change with the
echelon of command, it changes with time, and with changed cir,.
cumstances. There have been certain changes in the character
and-.. conduct of war for the last two hundred years which, of

necessity, :would have. changed certain of our attitudes toward the
term·''strat�gy" and cert�in of our associations .with the terni. Tlle
criticaLquestion at the moment how,ever, it seems. to me, is wh�ther
strategy is a concept which operates only in wartime or is a ·con
cept which is applicable to times of peace as well. My own feel
ing is very strong that the term strategy must be considered as

operating even when there are no active hostilities.

I do not mean that there is general agreement o� the part of

writers in this field. For example, there is an article in the current

nmnber of

World Politics

by Bernard Brodie, �n . old student .

of

mine, who says it is a mistake to use the term strategy in �on.,.

· nection with peacetime or in connection with politics.

Re prefe�s

the . words "security policy" as a definition of the things that I
would call "grand strategy."

Discussions about semantics are

singularly futile things which l would prefer to avoid. But one

of the reasons why I prefer to use the term, "national strategy'';

or if you like, "grand strategy", even as applied to peacetime, is

that if we use the term, we will be less likely than· we otherwise
would be to overlook the strategic factors in policy, as we have so

often overlooked them in the past. Therefore I would like to keep

the word "strategy" in the forefront of our peacetime thinking,

4
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as well as in the forefront of our wartime thinking, lest we make

critical errors of judgment. We must not overlook one of the
fundamental truths of politics, namely that most political decisions
in the field of international relations have strategical implications
and, vice versa, strategical decisions have their inevitable impact
on politics.

A British historian once said that the British Empire was
built up in a fit of absent-mindedness, a phrase which is very gen
erally quoted and which has an element of truth. But, if you look
over the history of Britain's decisions as to what she would take
as the reward for victory in any given situation, you are impressed
by the very strong influence that the Admiralty had in the making

of ultimate decisions. Usually wars broke out without any thought
that at their termination Britain would end up with another island

in the Mediterranean, or with a position as important, we'll say, as
the Cape of Good Hope. But, when it was being decided at the end
of the war what was to be done in the way of exacting some

penalty from the loser to reward the victor for victory, the Ad
miralty usually stepped in and discovered that there were some
positions of the loser which might be of use to British sea power,
and the civilian agencies of the British government not only heard

the Admiralty but usually accepted their recommendations-not
universally, but usually.
If I had time I could spend a few moments of profit and
amusement on the manner in which Benjamin Franklin frustrated
the Lords of the British Admiralty in connection with what Britain
would take at the end of the Seven Year's war, known in our his

tories as the French and Indian War. The Admiralty wanted to take
the French West Indian Islands and leave France in North America,
and Franklin was determined to get France out of North America
and leave her the West Indian Islands; and Franklin won out in
the ultimate debate.

5
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On the other hand, it has been. rare in American experi
ence for the military forces to have any influence whatsoever in
determining what should be done in matters of this sort. For ex
ample· in 1898, the United States could have had all of the former
Spanish Islands in the Pacific. We chose to take only the Phil

ippines and Guam, leaving the rest of the islands to Spain. They
were thereupon sold by Spain to Germany without any protest on
the part of the United States.

They were seized by Japan in 1914

without any reservation being entered by the United States con
cerning our interests in the matter. They were given to Japan

by the treaties of Versailles in 1918 without effective interposi
tion of the United States, except that they were placed under man
date rather than under Japanese sovereignty-a device which

proved to be a difference rather than real distinction. We had to
win those islands back at tremendous costs, as so many of you
in this room know, in World War Two.

Not only did the armed forces have nothing to say about

such questions, but it is doubtful that at that time they them

selves would have had as broad a grasp of the realities of Pacific
strategy as we had somewhat later.

And it is certain that no

civilian agency in the government gave any thought whatsoever

to the question of the disposition of those islands in relation to

the larger strategic interests of the United States and the
Pacific area.

It is because of that kind of blunder on our part, a blunder

that the British ordinarily did not make before the war of 1914,
which I think would warrant our keeping this word "strategy"
before us as a peacetime concept as well as a wartime concept.
Decisions must be made, if the interests of the United States are

to be properly served, which keep strategical considerations in the
foreground.

6
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So, if you want to call "national strategy," "security policy",

I think you are using a somewhat undramatic term, to put it mildly.

Instead of "national strategy", you are not only using a less des
criptive, a less dramatic term, but you are running a risk that

you will, in the use of that term, depart from one of the things

that is of principal consideration; namely, that political decisions

would be made with constant reference to their strategical im
plications.

Now a moment or two as to the way in which this term

strategy is used in language other than purely military language.

Hitler, for example, continuously used the term "broadened strat

egy," by which he meant a strategy somewhat wider than a purely

military strategy.

And Hitler was a genius at using political in

strumentalities and political formulas. as a means of weakening the
enemy's resistance to the program which he was in the process of

turning out.

A young American journalist wrote a vivid and ex

citing book in 1940 called,

The Strategy of Terror,

in which he said

that the principal weapon in the armory of the Nazies, even before
the shooting started in the War of 1939, was the terrorization of

other peoples so that they would either be afraid to resist, or that

they would resist half-heartedly, feeling that resistance would, in
any case, be futile.

Diplomacy has been called the strategy of peace. And I

have heard General Eisenhower refer frequently in the last few

months to the "strategy of bankruptcy" that the Soviet Union may

be following_;_a, policy of compelling the United States to resist

Soviet pressure at so many points that the burden of responsibility

will be greater than our economy can bear.

So that the word strat

egy in common usage, quite aside from those used in military

textbooks, would suggest that it is no longer purely a milit�ry
thing but is a concept which has non-military phases.

7
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Now, how did this all come about? Well, during the period
up until 1789 or 1793 in Europe, war was a comparatively simple

thing, fought with. relatively small mercenary armies for limited
objectives. With the French Revolution and the war which broke
out between France and the rest of Europe in 1792-1793 you had an
entirely new concept of the Army, and you had the beginnings of the
nation-in-arms, backed, in the case of the French Revolution, with
a tremendous ideological urge. Then the rise of industrialization in

Europe transformed the conduct of war from one which was a
relatively simple operation to one which involved the total resources
of the state, scientific, technological, industrial and the like. The

rise of nationalism required not merely that an Army should be a
conscript Army but also that the Army must know what it was
fighting for, since it would be likely to fight only for objectives

which were national objectives as distinct from the old dynastic
objectives.

. The Europeanization of the world, the spread of European
civilization throughout the world meant too, beginning with 1763

-or even earlier than that-that every war was a world war, and
that decisions concerning the conduct of the war had to be made not

concerning a single front in a limited geographical area, but in a

great variety of fronts in a great many geographical areas, so that

a very changed character and extent of war meant that you had to

have new definitions of strategy to conform to an entirely new

state of affairs.

Now, in a sense, the fundamentals of war haven't changed,

as war in its inception is a political act, not a military act.

The

decision to go to war, or not to go to war, is taken by people

who are essentially civilian in their attitudes, even though they

may be at the given moment officers of the armed forces; or they

may have the dual status that I mentioned of being both civilians

8
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and commanders in chief. But the decision to go to war is usually
taken by· a· person who is· civilian in attitude and who makes his
decisions for political rather than military considerations. I don't
like to quote the remarks of Clausewitz that "War is the continua
tion of politics by other means-", because it is cited so often that
it seems almost a bromide now. But it is nevertheless really true..
· As he said, war has a different vocabulary, but it has essentially
the same purposes as politics.
Further, the conduct of war in this day and generation is
likewise essentially a civilian matter. For one simple thing, the
civilians determine who shall be in command-which is a matter
of great moment in the conduct of war; And the ability to spot
. able and winning commanders is an ability of great moment to the
state. If you don't think so, just compare our situation in'. this
war with the situation in the Civil War when we had a whole
series of Burnsides, and Popes and "Fighting Joe" Hookers and
the like; where Lincoln seemed, at least in the early days of the
war, to be unable to pick winning commanders for the principal
theater of war.
Even in questions which are supposedly purely military, the
civilians frequently make the critical decisions. There is one
little quotation from Lloyd George's memoirs which I'd like to
read here. The question was before the British in the spring of
1915, as to the number of machine guns that they should provide
for the new army-the new army which had been brought into
being after the declaration of war in August 1914. And Kitchener,
who was the Minister of War in virtual command of the British
Army, suggested that the existing number of two machine guns
per battalion ought to be increased to perhaps four, but that any
thing over four would be a luxury. Of this Lloyd George said,
and this is from his memoirs:
9
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.. "T,ake · Kitchener's maximum, four 'per battalion, square it,
multiply· the result by tw<>; and,. when you are in sight
. of that, double it again for good luck."
· Thus Lloyd George, a civilian minister; multiplied the requis

ition of the · Chief of the· British · Armed · Forces· for machine guns
by sixteen. And by the late suminer of 1915 the British Army was

complaining that it still didn't have enough ·machine guns.

The same thing was true with Lloyd George's putting great

er emphasis on high explosive shells, as compared with ·Shrapnel

shells, very early in the war. So that a great many decisions which
seem to be military, even in their essence, are civilian, even in the
making of decisions in war time.

The more· you see of the con

duet of the First World War the more you realize what a tre;.
mendous role Lloyd George and Churchill played in Britain and

what a tremendous role Rathenau played in · Germany ·in· these
respects.,
.

Of course, you could go on with this sort of. thing, mention-

ing the complicated question of whether ships at sea ·· should be

convoyed in the face of the submarine menace-a decision which
w11,s mad� by Lloyd George, personally;, a decision that they should
be. convoyed.
. .
'

The question
of using tanks
was a decision which
.
. '
'

Chul'Chill
made and which he virtually rammed. do� the throats
.
·.
.
..
. .
pf the British Army against their will. I'm not talking of such

larger que�tions of strategy-such as a war of maneuver to be used

by flank attacks
through
the" ' Dardanelles or Italy versus
a war of'
'
.
. '

attrition-,-because there some of the civilian decisions seem, in

retrospect, to be wrong.· But one could cite ahn:ost as .many
. cases

�here the military decisions were also wrong.

In World War Two the same thing was true-that il' great

many of these critical decisions were made by civilians.

I suppose

one of the decisions which took the greatest courage, the greatest
10
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moral courage, was Churchill's decision to ship out of the British
Isles, in the critical days of 1940, large supplies· of British tanks,
virtually all of their tanks, to North Africa which he had deter
mined to hold and leave Britain itself, then facing invasion, without
tanks. That· decision took courage and balance, . and, in the end,
proved to be the right decision.
The question of how much of the national resources should
be devoted to air power is essentially a civilian decision in Britain
and, in some instances, a civilian decision in the United States. A
question of inter-allied unity of command. was a civilian decision
in. both the first and the second world wars and, . in this . ease,
we avoided the catastrophic results of failing to have unity of com
mand. for a long time. And . the decision to make the European
Theater the principal area of oper�tion was a decision which
Churchill succeeded in persuading both our military and our civil".'
ian authorities to accept again. It was a correct decision. I cite
these as showing that even in military matters civilians have to
make decisions in wartime which seem to be of military character.
War, too, is a social revolution; it does things to the social and
economic structure of a nation. It creates strains and stresses
which can be resolved only by far-reaching revolutionary chang�§l
in society and those changes have to be initiated and carried out by
the civilian authorities as well as suggested, in some instances, by
the military authorities.
As to making peace, the decision as to when peace negotia
tions will be opened and what will be the terms of peace is primarily
a civilian, rather than a military question. Even in time of peace
no political decisions of great moment. in international affairs can
be made without their military implications, and very few strategic
decisions can be made which do not have far reaching political im
plications.
11
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There was a feeling in mo-st professionaJ armed forces before

1914, and there still is...,....and there is reason for it-that politics

is- something. which the· professional officer should not interfere

with. And that's a sound judgment.

But politics is not something

which the professional officer should not be informed about, be

cause failure to be informed about the political results of strategic

decisions may be catastrophic.

I'd like to cite here two German officers of great professional

competence-one was Tirpitz, the builder of the German Navy�

the other was Schlieffen, the Chief of the German General Staff

before the First World War. Schlieffen persistently took the atti

tude that politics was no concern of the regular officer-'-that the de:..

cision should be made on· the merits of the military case without

reference to political repercussions-that politics was the business

of the civilian authorites. Tirpitz took the opposite point of viewthat politics was the· business of the professional officer.

Both

officers helped bring Germany to grief in the First World War.

Whereas, if you should have a somewhat middle of the road line that
it is the business of the professional officer to be

informed

about

political matters and to make strategical decisions in the light of
the political facts of the case-he doesn't need either to intervene

.. in political decisions on the one hand, or to ignore them on the
other as being outside his field of interest or competence.

What

I mean by that is that Schlieffen drew up the famous plan, that

. you all know about, for knocking France out of the war before
Russia could effectively mobilize. He was indifferent to the political
consequences of going through Belgium. That, in his ·mind, was

up to the German government to arrange. One of the catastrophic

errors of the war was the German decision to go through Belgium

even though political accommodations for that act had not been

arrived at... So that, if a brilliant officer ignores political considerations, as Schlieffen persisted in doing, the results may be disastrous.

12
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It is doubtful if Britain could have been brought into the war so
soon if it had not been for the issue of Belgium; and, if she hadn't
been · brought into the war so soon, the results of the war might
have been quite different.
On the other hand, Tirpitz actively interfered in politics
continuously. He understood their military implications, when he
took an active part in effecting political decisions to see that things
went his way. Furthermore, from the very beginning, he con
ceived of the German Navy as having a political, not a naval ob

jective. I could recommend very highly as an entertaining, in
teresting book, Tirpitz's Memoirs. They are very well done and
they give a picture of a type of naval thought that is worth seri
ous study. Tirpitz's view was-at least it may have been preliminary
to a larger view-but he never got the chance to enlarge the or

iginal concephthat the German Navy probably would never be
able to effectively challenge the British high seas fleet; but that,
if Germany had a big enough navy to make it risky for Britain to
fight Germany at all, the Navy would have the effect of keeping
Britain out of the war-the war which most German staff offi
cers presumed would come in Western Europe. So the German
navy was built on the idea that it would be a continuous threat
to the British fleet in the British home waters. That was a political
goal for the Navy, rather than essentially a naval goal. That is an
interpretation, if you like, but I think it is essentially a sound

interpretation. The German navy could have built a navy primarily

for waging a war against British commerce, and it could have put

still heavier emphasis on the submarine before the outbreak of the

war in 1914.

The German High Seas Fleet was designed as a

means of keeping Britain out of the war.

And Tirpitz miscalcu

lated, because he didn't understand two things; first, that it was

possible for the British to make all sorts of accommodations with

other powers so as to strengthen their fleet in home waters; and,

13
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second, that the one thing that Britain would not tolerate froni

any power on the continent of Europe was a real threat to the se

curity of the British Isles such as the German fleet implied, and as
Tirpitz intended it to imply.

I mention these two very gifted German professional officers

as illustrations of the danger of being uninformed about politics

and of the danger of either jgnoring them, as Schieffen was in

clined to do, or of attempting to influence political decisions, as

Tirpitz continuously tried to do.

There is a rather nice little story of Tirpitz's interfering in

political· decisions in a more direct way.

In 1912 to '13, when the

British were trying to come to a naval understanding with the Ger

mans on the basis of limiting the construction of capital ships,

Churchill went to see the German naval attache, at least met him in

formally, and said, "Now we really mean business about this; we
really want to cut down the building programs of both nations;
we want to come to an accommodation with Germany."

And the

German naval attache wrote a private letter to Tirpitz and said,

"What do I do with this information?" Tirpitz wrote back and

said, "You tell the German Ambassador that you have had a con

versation with Churchill and that your impression is that Churchill
was not very sincere about these naval negotiations."

That's how

far Tirpitz was willing to go. in influencing political· decisions.

But,

as I say, I'm not sure that this story is in his memoirs. We have

all of Tirpitz's papers, incidentally, in the National Archives in

Washington, and any of you who read German could have some
fun spending some time reading Tirpitz's papers, to advantage.

Now I have taken a shot at a definition of strategy which you

can find in

Makers of Modern Strategy.

I'm just going to take

time to read this and make comment on it, if I may.

"Strategy deals with war, preparation of war, and the
waging of war. Narrowly defined, it is the art of military

14
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command, of projecting and directing a campaign. The
Oxford dictionary defines it in a sense as the art of the
Commander in Chief. It is different from tactics which is
the art of handling forces in battle in much the same
way as an orchestra is different from its individual
instruments.
Until about the end of the 18th century, strategy con
sisted of a body of strategems and tricks of war, "ruses
de guerre", by which a general sought to deceive the
enemy. But as war and society have become more com
plicated-and war is an inherent part of society-strategy
has of necessity required increasing co�sideration of the
non-military factors: economic, psychological, moral, pol
itical and technological.
Strategy therefore is not merely a concept of wartime
but inherent element of statecraft at all times. Only the
most restricted terminology would now define strategy as
the art of military command."
In preparing this book Makers of Modern Strategy, we
brought · all sorts of people into the picture who wouldn't fit into
the category of military commanders. You know we use Marx and
Engels as fathers of the strategy w�ich to some extent the Soviet
Union has followed, the strategy of subversion, of subverting the
political integrity and the moral conviction in other states in the
justice of their cause. We took Alexander Hamilton and Rath
enau as the fathers of a nation with great industrial potential for
war. It was the conscious objective of Hamilton and Rathenau to
make the United States and Germany, respectively, nations of
great war potentials as they were certain to become by becoming
great industrial nations.
One can, if you like, accept the Brodie point of view
that these matters should be properly called "security policy"
rather than "strategy." As I say, that to some extent is a mat-
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ter of semantics but basically, to me, the important thing is to keep
continuously, by the use of the term strategy, national strategy or
grand strategy in the mind of the politician the idea that strategical

factors must be taken into consideration in making political de
cisions, and to keep continuously in the mind of the professional of
ficer the necessity of being informed upon politics, national and in
ternational, even though he may not take and perhaps should not
take an active part in influencing political decisions.
To go back to Tirpitz and Schieffen again, the Chief of the
German General Staff was of course the great figure in Germany.
The Navy in its early days was small potatoes in the national scheme
of things. As the Chief of the German General Staff, SchUeffen,
if he had been more alert than he was politically, might have seen
the political consequences of the vast German naval building pro
gram; and even as a soldier, had he been more alert, he would have
seen that from the point of view of Germany the building of a
fleet of this kind was a diversion of the resources of the nation
away from the basic plan. The Schlieffen Plan came within a hair's

breath of succeeding in 1914. If all of the resources that had gone
into the German navy from 1898 to 1914 had been available to the
right wing of the German army in those critical days of August
1914, the battle of the Marne might never have been fought,
Paris might have been captured and the war won by Germany
by a fairly safe margin. So that one can't overlook, in making

plans, the inter-relations of the Services to one another. I'm not
suggesting by this that all navies belong in that category. It's just
that in the nature of things the Germans could never hope to obtain
a navy of decisive character-a high seas fleet which could de
cide the outcome of the war. Their mere possession of a fleet
capable of challenging the British decided the outcome of the war
against them, which was one of the great German ,catastrophies.

The more I read of history the more I am convinced that
16
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history is sometimes - governed by coincidence. One of the - most

fateful coincidences in history is the fact that the United States
and Germany both became great powers at the same time.

Had

the United States become a great power fifty years later than she

did, Germany might well have won the First World War. In fact, I

think she would have won the First World War.

Had the United

States not been a great power in 1940, Germany would almost cer

tainly have won the Second World War.

And what is it in history

that accounted for this pure coincidence? The U�ited. Stat�s might

have become a world power fi:fty years later. Then you get back into
so many causes as to why_ so many people wanted to get out of

Europe and come· to the United States and thus build · up the

population and the resources . of this virgin continent.

Cohici

dence frequently plays a g:reat role, and coincidence of the Ger

man navalchallenge p:roved to be a challenge to the United States,
as

well as to Britain,

in the years 1914 to 1917. It was a matter

which very few Germans could have foreseen and which virtually

no American foresaw. Admiral Sims had a pretty clear picture of

the situation, but he was virtually alone in that· respect for a con
siderable period of time.

Now no ·nation, of course, can afford to make an over-all

foreign policy without reference to considerations
of national se.

- '

curity; that is, after all, fundamental. You take the history of

French policy over three hundred years; and the m:ore it changes,

_the more it remains the same thing, until the unhappy days be

tween the two ·world wars when the French didn't seem to be able

to make any effecfive decisions. And pretty much the · same thing

was true of Britain. But the French had running through their

history-three clear cut objectives; _one was to keep· Germany dis

united, because a disunited Germany was not a serious threat tp the

integrity of France; the second, was . to have allies in Eastern

Europe and Southern Europe so that, in the event France did have

17
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to .fight Germany, Germany would have to fight a wa.r on two fronts;
and a third objective was to have frontiers which were relatively
easily defendable because they were natural frontiers-mountains
and rivers and the like-or failing "natural frontiers" to have
fortified frontiers. And it was only when the French got away from
those basic factors, which ruled for three hundred years, that they
were finally and irrevocably defeated by the Germans in 1940.
The British have had a similar long-term security policy. At
the heart of that policy was the determination, over a period of
three hundred years, not to allow any naval power to rise which
would threaten the security of Britain's home waters. And
corollary to that was the idea that no powers must control the low
countries, which are across the narrow body of water, across the
straits, from Britain itself; and, finally, that no power must domi
nate the whole continent of Europe, because any power controlling
the whole continent of Europe would be in a position to build an ef
fective sea power paramount to that of Britain. And I could go on
with the United States and the Soviet Union as to these controlling
factors, as to these security factors, in making a foreign policy.
Those are things that no statesman may ignore except at the
national peril. At the same time, in individual cases, wrong de
cisions may be made because of failure to take account of the
strategical factor, as I cited in the case of the· Pacific Islands. So
that the wise statesman will keep continuously in the forefront,
rather than in the background of his thinking, the idea that strategy
is a concept of politics as well as a concept of war.
There is just one closing thought I'd like to throw out,
and that is, that it is important for the professional officer to be
informed on politics-the more broadly the better. Not merely so
that he can help to make the correct strategical decisions, but be
cause, at times, he has to make decisions which are political or
18
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quasi-political in character. There are always·some questions which
the civilian agencies of the government will not answer. In other
words, you can't draw a war plan without certain presumptions as
to who the enemy is going to be. It seems easy to do that now
because you know who is right over the horizon. We know that

now, but you remember the case of Woodrow Wilson.seriously sug
gesting that the Chief of Staff be fired in 1916 because he had draft
�d a plan for American campaigns against Germany in the event
we became involved iri the European war. Wilson had the theory

that merely drawing up a plan as to what you'd do if you got into
war with Germany would prejudice the good relations between the
United States and Germany, which at that time, even in the midst
of war, in which we clearly were going to be involved, he wished to
maintain on a cordial level.

Questions like, who is the enemy going to be? How near or
how remote is the possibility of hostilities? These are questions
which again civilian agencies of the government are always re
luctant to answer. Now I'm well aware that dealing with questions
of that kind on a military level is playing with dynamite, but it
is also playing with dynamite not to deal with them. And so you
have the real fact that you do have to deal with them. And you
have the fact that it is dangerous to deal with them. And part of
the art of being a soldier, or an airman, or a great commander of
naval forces is to deal� not with easy questions which anybody
could answer, but with the difficult questions.
I'd like to read one other thing; I'm going to leave this be
hind me. This is a brief statement taken from a lecture I gave in
Denver a year or so ago on "What is National Power?" and this
paragraph has been said by various· people to be worth quoting.

"National power in the present day world is a complex
and diverse phenomena. It is no longer the 'walled towns,
stored arsenals and armories, goodly races of horses,
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· chariots of war; elephants, ordnance artillery' and the like
to which Francis Bacon referred more than three centuries
ago.. Neither is gold the major source of nationa}might, as
was thought by the mercantilists of the 18th century.
Power is now, as it conventionally has been, men and ships
and guns. It is planes, rockets, bombs. It is landing craft,
flame throwers, machine guns. It is radar devices and fire
control mechanisms. But even more,. it is factories and
farms, assembly lines and tractors, skilled labor and tech
nicia:qs, labor.atories anq. the scientists who work in them.
It is the ribbons of steel called railroads and the ribbons of
concrete called. supe,r highways. It is the pronouncements
t
of statesmen aild the teachings of seers. I is tefophone
wire and radio communications. It is atomic weapons and
the means of.their manufacture. It is all the·multifariolis
forms in which modern industry, modern agriculture:, mod
ern communications and modern finance manifest them
selves. It is also education, the press, the church, the spirit
of. our youth. There is no . phase of American life which
does not contribute to our national power. Conversely, we ..
could not sacrifice any appreciable portion of our power
without curtailing some vital activity and impairing some
essential quality of the American people.
In other words, we cannot escape the role of Great
Power which History and Destiny have thrust upon us. A .
rich man may forsake the world and give all his goods to
the poor. But the wisdom of man and the art of the poli
tician know not how a Great Power can divert itself of
those things which can make it a Great Power. Power
then is fundamentally a matter of fact, not volition. We
may use our· power, or misuse our power. But we. cannot
discard our power or conjure it away."
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THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE USSR
A lecture delivered by
Dr. Demitri B. Shimkin
at the Naval War College
October 24, 1949

My discussion of Soviet economic potential embraces three

subjects: the general characteristics of Soviet·· economy, the ef

fects of World War II and postwar reconstruction, and Soviet
military-economic capabilities.

General characteristics: Seven features of the economy of

the Soviet Union appear to me to be distinctive: great mineral
wealth; a large rapidly growing population; limited agricultural

resources; inadequate development of transportation; vigorous,
highly centralized economic management; a technology still very

dependent on the West but rapidly maturing; and a pattern of

economic growth similar to that of the United States. Let us dis
cuss each of these in more detail.

Soviet mineral wealth: The known mineral reserves of the

USSR show great strength, adequate for very long term self-suffic

iency, in at least twenty-one minerals. These include the basic fuels,

coal and petroleum, as well as most of the major ferrous metals,

namely, iron ore, chromite, manganese, nickel and vanadium. Abund

ant reserves have been established for many non-metallic minerals:
andalusite, asbestos, bromine, flourspar, graphite, gypsum, phos

phates, potash, salt, sodium sulphate, and sulfur and pyrite. The

non-ferrous and rare metals, however, are not well represented: only

magnesium minerals, the platinum group, gold,· and niobium and
tantalum are definitely present in large quantities.

Dr. D. B. Shimkin is associated with the Russian Research Center,
Harvard University.
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Serious weakness in resources appears to be confined pri
marily to the non-ferrous and rare metals: aluminum-grade bauxite,
bismuth, cadmium, lead, silver, thorium, cerium and rare earths,
uranium and zinc. The concentrations and quantities of reserves
that are known fo� these minerals appear to be far from adequate

to supply Soviet needs. To this list of deficiencies can be added two
ferrous metals, molybdenum and especially tungsten, and a few non
metallics. They include abrasives and bearing jewels: corundum,

diamonds, rubies and sapphires, as well as piezo-electric quartz
crystals and high-grade talc.
Three final remarks will help clarify the mineral position of

the Soviet Union. First, a distinction must _be drawn between re
serves and production. Thus, while Soviet reserves of the fuels and

of such minerals as andalusite are great, current production is
relatively modest. ·secondly, the distribution of mineral deposits

throughout the territory of the Soviet Union is very uneven. The
greatest single concentration of deposits-about 25 % of the total
-is found in the Urals ; Eastern Siberia and Kazakhstan are also

rich, except in petroleum. In contrast, most of European Russia,
especially the Central Industrial Area (Moscow) and the Leningrad
District, is lacking in first-class deposits. Even the Ukraine has
_ serious deficiencies, for its resources are limited to great deposits
of coal, iron ore, manganese, salt, gypsum, phosphates and kaolin.
Thus the problems of mineral development are inextricably woven

with the development of transportation, shifts of population, and the
industrialization of remote, often inhospitable regions. Thirdly,
Soviet mineral supplies must be viewed in relation to the entire

Soviet sphere.
In some cases, the satellites can provide" large
quantities of deficient minerals to the USSR-talc and tungsten
being outstanding examples. In general, however, the satellites are
weak in known resources, and their needs, should industrial development be seriously undertaken, would represent a measurable drain
on Soviet mineral resources.
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Human reso1Jrces: The population of the USSR is large and
fertile. It grew from 147 to 174 millions between 1926 and 1939,
jumped to 193 millions with territorial gains in 1939-1940., . then
suffered a loss of 25 millions during World War II. This loss has
unquestionably been recovered by the present time ; by. 1960, the
population will have risen to a new high of 225 millions, and by
1970, to over 240 millions. Such a fertile population provides great
resilience to the disasters of war, even atomic war, epidemics and
famine: However, the large percentage of children and hence of
women1 with small. children in the population means also that the
effective labor force of the nation is smaller than for countries,
like the United States, with a more mature· population. Further
more, the··soviet Union is still at least half rural. In consequence
of these facts, the non-agricultural labor force of the Soviet Union
in 1948__:a basic measure of industrial potential-was about 73 %
that of the United States, and some 50 % greater than that of the
United Kingdom.
It should also be observed that the popµlation of the Soviet
Union is heavily concentrated, with fully 80% residing west of.the
Volga River. Out of some 21 cities with more than 300,000 inhabi
_tants in 1939, only 3 are east of the Volga-Caspian line. Thus,
human, mineral, and, . as will soon be shown, . agricultural resources
are widely separated in much of the Soviet Union. The cardinal
importance of transportation within the Soviet economy is clearly
evident.
Limited agricultural resources: As is well known, the food
producing capacity of the Soviet Union is limited in relation to a
population of over 200 million increasing over 1% annually. Normal
ly, the Soviet Union can provide a relatively small surplus of grain,
but is faced by chronic deficits of fats and proteins. However, at
least one year out of five since 1885-most recently, 1946-has been
marked by a serious crop failure, due. most commonly to drought.
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Furthermore, Soviet livestock has been seriously affected by World
War II, after a slow recovery from the mishaps of collectivization.
In all, livestock numbers today scarcely exceed those of Imperial
Russia on the eve of World War I. Finally, increasing population
pressure in Eastern Europe constantly decreases the possibility of
aid for the Soviet food supply from that source.
Consequently, the Soviets have become increasingly con
cerned with the promotion of agriculture. The provisions of the
Fourth Five-Year Plan proved to be inadequate, particularly in re
gard to the technical improvement of agriculture. They were
therefore supplemented by a special Three-Year Agricultural Plan
(1949-1951), stressing especially the increase of livestock and fowl.
In addition, the Soviet government inaugurated in October 1948, a
long term plan for the period 1949-1965. The most spectacular
feature of this plan is the determination to plant extensive shelter
belts between the Ural and Don Rivers, in order to protect crops
against dessication from Central Asiatic hot winds. Less spectacu
lar, but probably more important, are various directives modifying
crop practice to insure better water retention in the soils of the
Volga and Black Earth regions. This great reforestation plan pres
ents serious difficulties; its success will be dependent not only upon
the degree of Soviet effort and investment, but upon nature.
Limited development of transportation: For its maximum
economic growth the Soviet Union requires a farflung, high-capacity
system of transportation. Its population is concentrated west of
the Volga River. Most of its mineral resources are found in the
Urals and Asiatic Russia. Large areas lack vital resources: the sole
source of petroleum east of the Urals and north of Central Asia is
found on Sakhalin. Food deficits exist in the Central Industrial
Area and North Russia, in Central Asia and in the Soviet Far East.
These must be met by imports from the Volga and North Caucasus
regions in the west, and from Western Siberia in the east.
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Yet transportation is weakly developed in the USSR. Rail
roads move the overwhelming part of the freight, including bulky
cargoes such as petroleum, timber, grain and ores. But the railroad
l1etwork is well developed only west of the Volga; Moscow is its
heart, with eight major lines and seven large belt lines and laterals
radiating from the capital. To the east of the Volga, the Trans
siberian Railroad to Vladivostak, with feeders to Magnitogorsk and
the Kuznetsk Basin, and the line from Kirov to Molotov, alone are
double-tracked. Genuine networks exist only in the Urals and
Kuznetsk Basin. The important lines serving Central Asia are
all single-tracked, and of light construction.
The Fourth Five-Year Plan contemplated rehabilitation of
the war damaged lines in the west, and new construction, notably

the Magnitogorsk-Kuznetsk Basin or South Siberia Line, in the east.
While the evidence is not clear, it appears that rehabilitation has
been largely accomplished, but that new construction lags.
The other forms of transportation in the Soviet Union are
definitely of secondary importance. Among waterways, only the
Volga-Caspian system, ever faced with the problem of dropping
water level, is of great significance. Pipelines and highways have

. but a rudimentary development.

Finally, it is important to note the adverse effects of Soviet
climate on transportation. Even the Caspian-Volga system is
closed by ice between December and April. Railroad capacity is
sharply reduced by winter snow and cold, as well as by spring
thaws. A glance at the effects of temperature alone, based upon
experience tables of the Alaska Railroad is revealing. In January,
for example, the capacity of the entire Soviet network east and
north of the line Moscow-Stalingrad-Lake Balkhash, inclusive, falls
to 70% of its warm-weather capacity. From Krasnoyarsk to Vladi
vostok, the reduction is even greater, ranging from 40 to 50%.
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Such variations in transportation capacity are reflected, of course,
in the annual fluctuations of the entire Soviet economy.
Soviet economic management:. Economic planning and admin
istration in the USSR has been vigorous and purposeful. From the
beginning of the Five Year Plan, the same strategic. concepts have
been dominant; primary emphasis upon heavy industry, maximum
development of the secure area between the Volga and Yenisei
:Rivers, achievementof self-sufficiency in critical materials, and ease
and rapidity of conversion from civilian to military production in
times of crisis.
While major errors, such as in the handling of collectiviza
tion, marked the early history of Soviet economic management, evi
dence of increasing flexibility and maturity in. management is
growing. The devaluation of the ruble was achieved without notable
setback. In 1947, practical considerations led to a change of em
phasis in investment from the eastern regions to the Ukraine. And
in minuter affairs, a more practical attitude is also manifest: Thus,
in manufacturing, specific attention is being paid to working-unit
layout, to promote worker efficiency by reducing waste motion. In
strument and spare parts carts, belt lines and pneumatic trans
porters are diminishing the great amount of manual effort and
hence the overstaffing characteristic of Soviet plants. Diversifica
tion of product, systematic testing of more adequate samples, and
greater attention to repair and maintenance are now evident, par
ticularly in the Soviet automotive industry.
Technology: Presumable Soviet mastery of the ato.:tnic bomb
provides radiant advertisement of their research and develop
ment. I must admit to considerable surprise at the early date of
this achievement. The cause for this surprise may lay as much in the
over-estimation of the complexities of the secret, as in under-es
timation of Soviet technology and industry.
I
ff
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In the materials I have worked with, several of the old
characteristics of Soviet technology are still evident; First is the
careful · review of every American development. For example,
seven of the projects of the research plan of the AU-Union Scien..
tific Research Institute of the Auto-Tractor Industry (NATI) for
1949 call for the detailed testing and investigation of American trac
tors. Second is the lag between plan and performance in the mass
production of new models; not until late 1948 were all of the
basic truck models to be adopted in the postwar period actually
in prod�ction. Third is Soviet reluctance to cease production of
obsolete equipment. In 1948, nearly half of all Soviet truck out
put still consisted of the venerable GAZ-AA and ZIS-5 trucks, of
1928-1932 vintage.
At the same time,. I must report major new trends in
Soviet technology. The most important development, one which ap
proaches in my mind the significance of the atomic bomb, is the
preparation and publication i:p. 1946-1949, of the monumental Soviet
handbook of machine building (Mashinostroyenye Entsiklopediches
kii Spravochnik, 14 vols.) This handbook, in 14 volumes, is equivalent
to such American publications as the American Society for Testing
Materials and the Society of Automotive Engineers handbooks.
Based on a comprehensive digest of foreign and Soviet experience,
it provides technological standards, uniform testing procedures, and
methods of computation and design for major sections of Soviet
industry. It provides the foundation for a flexible standardization
of materials and processes. The ultimate effects of such technologi
cal standardization-one of the prime advantages of American in
dustry bver those of Britain and the Continent-can scarcely be
overestimated.
0

Other new trends are greater emphasis upon diversification
and production to meet specialized requirements; lack of such an
emphasis has been one of the basic weaknesses of Soviet industry.
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Thus large numbers of new alloy steels and of specialized equip
ment, such as highly mobile 6x6 trucks with independent sus
pension are now under development or in production. Further
more, as I mentioned previously, the testing of new models· and pro
cesses is being conducted on a far wider scale than in earlier
years.
Also important are indications of a new approach in Soviet
technology: stress upon fundamental engineering solutions to press
ing problems as opposed to crude improvisation. For example, the
Soviet government has been concerned for many years with the
use of local fuels, such as peat and firewood, for automotive vehicles.
During World War II this problem was met by bulky, very inef
ficient gas producer equipment installed on ordinary trucks, busses
and tractors. In contrast, the Soviets in August, 1949, published
the specifications and plans of a new, experimental, 6-ton, steam
truck, the NAMI-012, with a 3-cylinder, 100-hp engine of original
design.
Finally, the Soviets are developing a number of shortcuts
to difficult technical problems. Thus, they have immensely re
duced their requirements for nickel, vanadium and titanium by util
izing naturally alloyed ores from Khalilovo, Kusa, Yelizavetinski
Rudnik and other deposits, for the production of a wide series of
low-alloy steels and malleable cast irons.

The Soviet Economy During World War II and the Period of
Reconstruction.
In 1940, the Soviet Union was the greatest economic power
in Europe except for Germany. Its population totalled nearly 200
million; its industrial labor force, some 30 million. In that year, it
produced 141 million metric tons of coal plus 25 million metric tons
of lignite; 31 million metric tons of petroleum, 18.3 million metric
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tons .of steel, 5.8 million metric tons of cement, 119 million metric
tons of grain, and 208,000 trucks and cars. Its electrical capacity
reached 11.3 million kilowatts by the �nd of the year. Its railroads,
with 30,000 locomotives and 570,700 two-axle and 191,700 four-axle
freight cars, carried a traffic of 415 billion ton-kilometers or 282
billion net ton-miles, second only to the United States. A large pro
gram of modern-in the case of armor and rockets, highly advanced
---ordnance production was under way, although many phases of
Soviet technology remained a decade or more behind the West.
The war with Germany led to enormous losses, totalling pos
sibly 25 % of the entire national. wealth of the USSR. In addition
to a direct 3:nd inclirect population loss of some 25 .million, economic
· losses were staggering: about 25 % of the metal.,.cutting. machine
tools, 34% of the saw-mill capacity, 30% of the cattle, 71% of the
hogs, 60% of . the coal production, 55 % of the steel production,
44% of the electrical power capacity, 48% of the freight cars, and
53% of the locomitves-all of those were destroyed or heavily
damaged.. Nevertheless, complete economic mobilization, ruthless
cutting-back of the civilian economy; carfeul alloc.ation an� rigid
control of raw materials, transportation and power; and bold evacu
ation of endangered manufacturing capacity to the Urals, Volga
Region, Western Siberia and Central Asia kept alive the fighting
capacity of the Soviet Union. From 1942 on, Lend Lease also pro
vided indispensable assistance. The value of Lend Lease never ex:;,
ceeded 10% of Soviet domestic production as a whole, but in many
critical areas of military supply-aluminum, signal equipment,
trucks, etc.-it provided two-thirds and more.
Through all these measures, the Soviet Union was able to
. maintain and develop a major military effort. It maintained an
avera�e of some 13 million men and women in its armed forces. Its
military production amounted to approximately one-third that of
the United States. However, because its allies relieved it of the need
29
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for significant naval forces or heavy bombardment aviation, the
USSR was able to approach the United States in the production of
a number of weapons.

During the last three years of the war, an

nual Soviet output of tanks and self-propelled artillery averaged
30,000; of aircraft, primarily fighters and ground-attack aviation,

40,000; of artillery of 20mm caliber and higher, 120,000.

At the

same time, the expansion of basic production continued, both to
ameliorate war losses and to relieve critical bottlenecks.

Coal and

lignite production in the unoccupied regions was expanded by more

than 40 million metric tons. Manufacturing in the east increased
sharply, so that the Urals alone were able to produce 40% of the
total ordnance of the Soviet Union.

The output of aluminum, cop

per, lead, tin, tungsten, and vanadium rose far above pre-war levels.

Several important railroad lines were constructed, especially to im

prove communications between Central Russia and the Caucasus.

Yet retrogression also took place in the deep rear. Excessive pump-

ing and lack of drilling cut petroleum output by more than one-

third.

where.

Lack of maintenance reduced railroad capacity everyThus, all in all, the Soviet Union emerged from the war

seriously weakened.

Less than a year after the end of the war, in '.March 1946,

the Soviet Union proclaimed a new Five-Year Plan of economic re

construction and expansion.

industry and transportation.

First priority was allocated to heavy

Nearly half of all the expenditures

were to go to the reconstruction of devasted areas, while about one

sixth were to be concentrated on the railroads.

What have been the achievements of the Fourth Five-Year

Plan to date?

According to official Soviet statistics, published in

January 1949, national production, after a rise of 27 per cent in,
1948 over 1947, had exceeded the 1940 level by 16 per cent, a rate

of progress in excess of the plan. · Productive increases for the
period 1945 through 1948 have, however, been very different in dif30
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fering parts of the national economy. The patterning of these dis
similar increases is instructive: least change has been claimed in the
size of the non-agricultural labor force, a rise of 23%. Other . in
dices of total national output are said to have risen somewhat more:
electrical power capacity by 36%, and freight car loadings by 43%.
Next in scale have been the alleged increases in mineral production
-'-Copper, coal, petroleum, steel, pig iron, zinc and lead-which range
from 34 to 59%. Claimed increases in grain output total 79 % •
Even higher are the claims for construction materials: 71% for tim
ber, 252% for cement. Increases in manufacturing top the list:
90 % for cotton cloth, 158% for trucks and cars, and 622% for trac
tors. Further steady increases have been claimed (July 23, 1949),
-for the first six months of 1949.
Two questions arise from these claims: are they true? If so,
how have the Soviets been able to achieve them?
It is my belief that these claims are substantially accurate,
although affected moderately by the inflationary bias of a dispro
portionate rise of manufacturing over raw materials production. I
estimate, relying in part on the work of my colleagues in the Rus
sian Research Center, that absolute production figures for 1948 were
approximately the following: coal, 140-150 million metric tons; lig
nite, some 50 million metric tons; petroleum, 29-31 million metric
tons; steel, 18-20 million metric tons; aluminum, some 160,000
metric tons; copper, 150-160,000 metric tons; lead, 125,000 metric
tons; zinc, some 150,000 metric tons; nickel, excluding that in ·
naturally alloyed ores, some 14,000 metric tons; grain, about 100
million metric tons; power capacity, 12-14 million kilowatts; and
truck and car production, some 260,000 units. In these regards,
production exceeds 1940 levels by moderate to large amounts. However, other branches of the national economy-railroad ton-mileage,
housing, livestock, and consumers' good�probably lag at levels 20%
or more below the 1937-1940 peak. One must note that the con31
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struction of 19 new workers' houses : at Voroshilovgrad was still
front;.page news in the Soviet pressin the summer of 1949.

The mechanisms of Soviet recovery are partly explfoable.

Five factors appear to have been important.

First, the expansion

of Soviet agricultural land area through the absorption of new terri-

tories on the Western frontier.

Second, the increased availability

of many minerals through wartime expansion of output as_ noted

above, through territorial acquisitions, specifically potash and petrol"'.
eum from Poland, and through importation frOJll .. the satellite
regions in Europe and As!a. For nine minerals; supplies avail_able

from these regions exceed Soviet domestic production. These minerals include antimony, barite, bismuth, bromine, cadium, flour�par,

potash, talc and tungsten. Significant amounts of bauxite, beryllium,

coal and lignite, cobalt, coppe!' gold, graphite, lead, magnesite, magnesium chloride, metallic magnesium; and mercury, molybdenum, pe'-

troleum, _phlogopite mica, �alt, ura.nium and zinc, are also procurable
r

from these peripheral regions. The resources of East Gemanr and
North Korea are esl)ecially important for. the Soviet Union.

T.he

third factor is the large-scale reconversion of. a machine tool stock

which "1as relatively lightly damaged during the war and which
was then augmented, certainly above pre-war levels, by Lend Lease
and war booty.

The fourth factor has been the quantitative and,

above all, the qualitative improvement of the industrial labor force
resulting from the demobilization of the armed forces.

The fifth

factor, less certain than the others, appears to be a shift in the

Fourth Five-Year Plan from a balance between reconstruction in

the West and new investment in the East, to a concentration of
effort largely on the West.

This was. foreshadowed by the Spec-

ial Plan for 1947, which cut back investment -particularly in rail".'

road construction.

It is most clearly shown by comparison. of the

claimed gains in production for the Ukraine in comparison with the
rest of the Soviet Union during 1948.

A few figures tell the story:
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Item
Total Output
Pig Iron
Steel
Coal
Electrical Power
Tractors
Caustic Soda
Mineral Fertilizers
Meat
Soap

Percentage Increase 1948 over 1947
Entire USSR
27
22
28
14
16
104
25
43
25
45

Ukraine
43
41
74
22
43
122
49
72
34
96

Clearly, much of the weight of recent Soviet recovery can be as
cribed to the revival of the Ukraine. Thus the balance of Soviet
industrial output is again shifting westward, a phenomenon of ob
vious political and military significance.
Three final points may be considered in regard to recent
Soviet economic growth; the degree of self-sufficiency of the entire
Soviet sphere, the scale of growth in comparison with other in
dustrial nations, and the comparative reserve of economic potential.
First, it must be emphasized that the Soviet sphere cannot be re
garded as self-sufficient on any appreciable consumption level.
Serious deficiencies exist for at least 20 minerals, ranging from
antimony to diamonds to zirconium; for other raw material$,
such as cotton, rubber, and leather; for fats and proteins; and
.for many manufactures, electrical equipment, tubing, etc. Second,
it is important to bear in mind that nations other than the Soviet
Union, particularly the United Kingdom, Canada and Poland have
exhibited marked economic gains in recent years. I estimate that
the current production of the Soviet Union is now roughly equal to
that of the United Kingdom and Canada together, possibly 40%
that of the United States.
33
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Third, it is critically important to distinguish between cur

rent production and capacity. The Soviet Union is operating un
der forced draft, with relatively little reserve. The United States,
although, more fully occupied than in 1940, has measurable slack
in its economy. Thus the present economic potential of the United
States, despite astounding Soviet progress, is still three to four
times greater than that of the USSR. But this potential could be
reached only by total mobilization over one to two years.

Soviet. Economics Capabilities.
The Soviet Union has substantially emerged from its period
of reconstruction from the ravages of the war. By great persist
ence, and by ruthless use of its resources and those squeezed from
the satellites, it has been able to achieve a faster rate of economic

growth than I, for one, anticipated. Continuing growth must be an
ticipated. Bottlenecks in terms of mineral and other raw materials
deficiencies, of agricultural setbacks, and of weaknesses of trans-

portation may reduce the rate of growth. The Soviet Union must
also consider to an increasing degree the needs of its old and new

satellites; greater moderation in its policies of colonial exploitation
of these territories would certainly be practical wisdom, as Jugoslavia has shown. However, the greatest indeterminant in future
Soviet economic development arises in its leadership. Will Stalin's

successor, when the time comes, be able to drive his country with
equal determination and success? Russian history since the time of
Peter the Great arouses some doubts.
Nevertheless, prudence requires full expectation of continued

Soviet economic growth.

The only answer to this· challenge that

I know of is the continued economic and political growth of the

entire Western community of nations.

The United States alone

can no longer expect to meet the threat of Soviet aggression in

spare moments.
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In the fields of economic management and technology, the
historic Soviet patterns of highly centralized planning and primarily
imitative development are continuing. But Soviet techniques of
management, Soviet research and development are unquestionably
improving and maturing. The lessons learned in World War II, the
treasure trove of information gained through Lend Lease, are
being digested. Along with the atomic bomb, we must anticipate
a Soviet proximity fuze, anti-aircraft guided missiles and other
answers to the well-proclaimed threat of the high-altitude, un
escorted bomber. Yet the effects of intellectual intimidation and of
· self-imposed isolation should not be discounted; weaknesses will
exist and must be searched for.
In case of war, Soviet economic mobilization must be ex
pected to be as far reaching as in World War II. Soviet ability to
accept brutal losses, to recover from virtual disaster must not be
forgotten. A great margin of economic and technological superior
ity still must be ascribed to the United States �ut the time for an
easy discounting of Soviet potential has long- since passed.
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THE PROBLEMS OF CHINA
A. lecture delivered by
Dr. T. R Tsiang
at the Naval War College
October 21, 1949

The subject on which I have been asked to speak today is
a very large one. Everybody knows that China has many problems,
some of which are both complicated and important. It is im
possible within the limited time at my disposal to mention, not to
say discuss, ali the problems of my country. I will talk mainly
on a problem which seems to me to be basic to all problems. If we
understand this one problem, we will have the background for un.
derstanding many of the others. · I hope I can contribute some
light towards a better understanding of my country.
The problem which I wish to discuss with you today is the
problem of poverty. The depth and breath of this problem are so
well-known to you that I do not need to cite statistics. We
Chinese are a nation of farmers. Aside from the frontier regions
in the Northeast, Northwest and Southwest the average farmer
cultivates in northern China less than three acres and in southern
rice-land China less than two acres. On such tiny plots of land
the farmer works hard, as hard as any human being can be ex
pected to work, but he is subject to the mercies or rather cruelties
of climate which inflicts on him frequently either a flood or a
drought. .He is also subject to pest which consumes his crops. He
has made no progress in the selection of seeds, improvement of cat
tle, use of fertilizers, and marketing for about a thousand years.
The marvel is two-fold. In the first place, it is a marvel that the
Chinese farmer attained such a high level of agriculture more
than a thousand years ago. It is also a marvel that he has con
tinued to practice the same agriculture for these thousand years.
Dr. T. F. Tsiang is Chairman of the Chinese Delegation to the
United Nations General Assembly.
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As a result of the small size of Chinese farms and the
lack of progress in agricultural arts, probably forty percent of the
Chinese population live under conditions of food, clothing, and
housing which must be characterized as sub-human.
Even in recent decades, famines, killing a million people at
a time, have occurred and will most likely occur again.
Poverty is the root of all China's ills. It permeates all life
in China. It darkens the whole horizon. Without having lived in
the . midst of . such poverty, you cannot imagine what it can do
to the bodies, minds and souls of people. What people. call poverty
in this country would be and should be called wealth in China. The
Chinese variety of poverty is simply unimaginable to the average
American, and for this reason, the American people have not, up
to the present, understood the problems of China.
The agricultural and industrial resources of China cannot
be compared to the resources of the United States, the Soviet Union
or the British Commonwealth of Nations. Even with the highest
development of natural resources, the Chinese people cannot look
forward to a day when they could live as well as people in this
country. Nevertheless, with the resources we have, we Chinese
could develop in China a standard of living much better than what
we have today.
Let me now take up the causes of Chinese poverty. I would
like to say at once that the Chinese people are neither stupid nor
lazy. I have travelled in many countries and observed carefully
the behavior of peoples, and I am convinced that the Chinese people
are second to none in intelligence and industry. Chinese mechanics,
who were but yesterday totally ignorant and even afraid of ma
chines, have won the respect of foreign engineers who have seen
them at work. The cause of Chinese poverty does not lie with the
character of the Chinese people.
38
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·· · One of the indisputable causes of China's poverty is the size
of China's population. We do not have accurate statistics; but all
students of the subject agree that China's present population is
somewhere between four hundred and five hundred millions. Be;.
fore the eighteenth century China, at no moment in her history,
had
population larger than seventy million. The phenomenal
growth of population in China occurred in the 18th century. The
17th century was a period of banditry, civil war and famine. Dur..
ing its course China's population must have been thinned out. The
18th was a century of peace, and on the whole, good government.
If the official records of the government of that period are to be
believed, it will be found that China's population had more than
tripled in-the course of a century. At the beginning of the 19th
century China already had reached the population figure of three
hundred million. That is a phenomenon unprecedented, both in the
world's history and in China's history. No country, based on agri
culture, whether in the East or in the West, ever faced the gigantic
problem of feeding a population of three hundred millfon. Now it
is between four hundred and five hundred million.

a

Another cause of Chinese poverty is the stagnancy of the
arts of production and distribution.. From the historical sources
which we have, including pictures of rural life painted a thousand
years ago, I have come to the· conclusion that China has not· made
any advance in the industrial and agricultural arts duririg the past
thousand years. I am not in a position to explain this stag:nanci.
The West in recent centuries has made splendid progress in science
and" technology. The question naturally arises-why have the
Chinese not done the same thing? It is a question asked by many
people. It remains today without an adequate answer.
can only
make a suggestion.

r

The answer must be found, it seems to me, - in the type of
culture which China has developed. Under the cultural conditions

39
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss10/1

42

Naval War College: December 1949 Full Issue

RESTRICTED
in China, the men of intellect and learning have not thought it

worthwhile to pay any attention to practical matters. It . was be

neath the dignity of an educated person to soil his hands in labor;

Education and culture have been totally divorced from agriculture;

industry and transportation.

In ancient times China produced

great engineers who built, among other things, the Grand Canal

and irrigation systems in the Northwest and on the plains of
Szechwan.

In ancient times some of the Chinese emperors · and

lesser rulers did pay attention to practical arts.

But during· the

last thousand years the brains of the Chinese have failed to render
any help to the toiling hands and legs and aching backs.

Con.,.

fuscian culture is rich in the understanding of human nature and
social relationships, but it is at the same time woefully. deficient in

the understanding and mastery of material and animal nature.

How can we solve. the problem of Chinese poverty? I do

not intend to go into a theoretical discussion of this question. I will
only summarize the actual steps which have been taken so far and
which point the way towards a right solution.

With modern education in China a revolution, more sig

nificant than the political revolutions which have been so volumi
nously reported in the papers, has occurred. in the outlook on life

of the Chinese intellectual class.

Modern science and modern en

gineering have caught the imagination of the people during the last

thirty years.

Together with this, the intellectual class in China

have come to regard the poverty of the country as a shame and an

unnecessary shame at that.

For the first time in one thousand

years the mind of China has returned to grain, plants and farm
cattle, to water and soil, to coal and iron, to cotton, wool and

silk, to brick and cement, to rivers, highways and railways. Be-

fore the beginning of World War II, there was a feeling of hope

in China.

One of China's historians wrote in 1935 that Chinese

civilization did not need to follow the curves of ancient Babylon-
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On the contrary, the

mastery of science and technology would give China a new cycle

of history, more prosperous and happier than any golden age which

tradition attributed to some remote period in the ancient history of
China.

Take for example cotton.

The soil and climate of China

could make the country self-sufficient in cotton, but as late as 1932

one of the greatest causes of China's imbalance in international
payments was the heavy import of American and Indian cotton.

From 1932 onwards, the Government of China, with the help of

some American and Chinese cotton experts, found new and im
proved cotton seeds in the United States.

They imported these

seeds, distributed them among the farmers and guaranteed them
a profitable return on their crop.

sufficient in cotton.
China's history.

By 1936 China became self

Such an achievement is unprecedented in all

The farmers in North China, where cotton was

grown, benefited from it.

The whole nation benefited from it.

It

was the :first time for a thousand years that the Chinese farmer

found that his Government could and did confer on him a benefit.

During the time when some scientists and government

bureaus were busy with cotton, others worked on rice and wheat.

Soon after the National Government established the capital in Nan

king in 1926, it set up a Central Agricultural ·Research Institute.

The scientists in that Institute experimented with varieties of wheat
and rice from China as well as from foreign lands.

In time they

produced a new variety of wheat and a new variety of rice which

increased the yield by eleven to thirteen percent.

The new seeds

could not be imported; they had to be reproduced in China.

To

cover the whole wheat and rice areas with the new varieties would

require many years. This beneficent work _was unfortunately inter

rupted by the war, but the seeds are still there. From the work of

41
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss10/1

44

Naval War College: December 1949 Full Issue

RESTRICTED
these scientists, the rice and wheat growers can expect to increase their crops by eleven to thirteen percent.
The Northwest of China is a region with good soil but a
thin population. In ancient times it was considered the granary of
China and was for many centuries the center of the Chinese em

pire. After the 9th century it began to decay. Nobody today
knows exactly all the causes for the decay of China's Northwest.
Some attribute it to climatic changes. In 1921 a famine occurred
in Shensi, one of the Northwestern provinces, which caused the loss
by starvation of more than a million people. A great Chinese

engineer who was a native of that province, convinced first the
local government and later the National Government that the decay
of the Northwest was due to the neglect of the irrigation systems
which served the province in the great Han and Tang Dynasties '.
He started to repair some of the ancient canals in the region.
Later he constructed new canals and reservoirs. His work and
the work of his successors have been supported by the National
Government since 1931 up to the present moment, not omitting

even the long years of war with Japan. In 1941, '42 and '43 I
was in charge of budgeting in the Central Government. It was
my pleasure to find the funds so that the construction of irrigation

in the Northwest might not be stopped by the war. Today the
Province of Shensi is permanently secured from famine, because
in that province, with a steady supply of water, the land can yield
all the food that the people there need.
A similar constructive program was carried out in public
health, and in highway and railway building, with similar good results. This approach to the problem of China's poverty may be
called the constructive approach.

We could attack the problem of poverty in China by taking
a different approach. We could start by redistributing the wealth
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of the country, particularly land. I, myself, am in favor of agrarian
reform, and I am sure that most of you would also favor it. Let
us therefore discuss agrarian reform both as a cure for China's
poverty and as a matter of social justice.
It has been many centuries since the agricultural land of
China was concentrated in the hands of a small number of big
landlords. Except in the frontier regions of Manchuria, China
does not have large estates. In most of the provinces a man owning
twenty acres of wheat or rice land would be considered a big land
lord. In my own district there was a big landlord who owned 135
acres of rice land. He was the top man in a district of a million
and two hundred thousand people. When he died, his land was
divided among his ten sons who received each a little over thirteen
acres. In China inheritance has not been by primogeniture but
by equal division among all the sons, and now, by government legis
lation, among all sons and daughters. The practice of equal division
among the sons has prevented the rise of big estates. Nevertheless,
there is inequality in the country and exploitation of the tenant by
the landlord. Such inequality and such exploitation should be
abolished.
The problem of redistribution of agricultural land in China
has been studied by many Chinese and American agricultural ex
perts. With the exception of the Communists, all other students
of the subject favor a program of agrarian reform whereby the
tenant will be aided by the government to buy the land which he
cultivates through a series of annual payments. Very large land
estates exceeding one hundred acres might be subject to partial
expropriation. The valuation to be put on middle-sized estates,
that is, below one hundred and above twenty acres, would be so
fixed as to mean a partial expropriation of the current market
value of the land. In general terms, these are the features of an
43
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agrarian reform which impartial students of the subject would
favor
. The Communists in China advocate outright expropriation
of all the land that is cultivated by tenants. This is their economic
revolution. They have concentrated all their propaganda on this
one issue. In fact, they have nothing else to offer in the economic
field. The Communist program may be good politics but it is not
good economics, and it certainly cannot be justified on grounds
of social justice. If carried out, fifty million people, whose land
will be expropriated, would be left destitute. No government,
Communist or otherwise, could provide these people with jobs or
support them on a dole. Should they be allowed to starve? In
the second place, if such a program were carried out, the actual
average benefit on the tenant would be less than one-third of an acre.
You would have, as a result, such a minute division of the land
whereby each farm family has a little land, too much to be thrown
away and too little to sustain a family. Nevertheless, the Communists have used the scheme to win the political battle in China.
I personally anticipate that, as a result of communism in the
rural areas, there will be a long period of turmoil and village feud,
accentuated by famine on a large scale.
In China, there is no land of feudal origin. Whatever land
the people own, has all been bought and paid for. Outright ex
propriation cannot be justified on the ground of the historical origin
of land ownership in China. In this respect the Chinese problem of
agrarian reform is totally different from the same problem that
existed in Ireland in the 19th century, or in Russia and other eastern European countries in the 20th century.
The best scientific judgment of the experts favors a pro
gram of agrarian reform whereby the peasant would be aided by
the Government banks in purchasing the land which he cultivates.
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This has never been tried, because the war with Japan put a stop to
all constructive effort. I personally believe that even in the midst
of war, this program should be pushed forward. I am afraid
that some leaders in China used the war as an excuse for post
poning reform.
However, the war did come. It was real. It was gigantic.
It did tax China's human and natural resources to their utmost
limit.
For eight long years Free China used the western part
and: les,s c:lev�loped half of the coun,try as . a base to fight . against
Japanese invasion and: blockade. . Tlie world has not begun to un,.
derstand the economic meaning of that long war and plockade�
Before the war, China had no economic surplus or reserve pro
ductive power. Economically, China had no capacity whatsoever
for war. As a result, the Chinese people fought the war by
deepening their own misery.
This economic -aftermath of the
war indeed served as fertile soil for the growth of communism
iriChina;
The Government, in �hting the war, resorted to printing
paper money which in turn culminated in wild spiral inflation.
I think the Chiries.e Government could have done better in war
time finance. Difficult though the situation was, China did not
have to come out of the war in such a state of demoralizing in
flation as she did. . She could have done better, though not much
better. In the first place, in western China, which was Free China;
industry has not beeri developed to any high degree. There was
very little wealth for the Government to tax. In the second place,
the type of economy prevailing in China did not lend itself to
rationing. Chinese wealth, such as there was, has been mainly
agricultural production and that production consisted mainly in
subsistence production, not production for the market. Most farm45
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ers grew the food for the consumption of their own· families; Only
a small percentage has ever been brought out to the market, and
then only to the nearby village or town market. Had the govern
ment tried to ration food in China during the war, we would have
had to station a policeman in every farmer's family to see to it
that he and his wife and children did not consume more than the
ration quota.
Meanwhile, inflation has wiped out the whole middle class.
It has inflicted untold sufferings on teachers, scientists, writers
and government employees. Among my friends and relatives,
there are many whose death has been hastened by malnutrition or
who have been permanently incapacitated by the effects of mal
nutrition.
I have read and heard many explanations for the present
sorrowful state of China. Some put the blame on the reaction
aries. Some criticize Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek as shoulder
ing the. chief responsibility. Leaders do have their responsibility, but
I submit that an objective study of the total situation in China would
declare that the sad plight of China today is mainly the result of
the war, on top of a poverty, which was deep-rooted, vast and old.
Post-war relief, particularly through UNRRA, did some
thing useful. I know it from personal knowledge, when I directed
post-war relief and rehabilitation in China. UNRRA spent in China
altogether $670,000,000;00. It was a big sum. Seventy percent
of this sum came from the good people of this country; Great Brit
ain, Canada, Australia, India, and several Latin-American countries,
notably Brazil, all contributed. To these generous donors, the
Chinese people will always be grateful. But the per capita relief in
China, as compared with the per capita relief in Poland, Czecho
slovakia, Ukraine, and Greece is equivalent to one to thirty. It
was extremely meagre. Furthermore, it was hampered by the Com46
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munists. They destroyed railways faster than I could rehabitate
them, for the Communists reasoned that the misery of the people
was to be their strongest ally.
Now I wish to trace the relation between poverty and the de
velopment of democratic government in China. Let me say at the
very beginning of this discussion that the average man in China is
not interested in politics or government. Food, clothing and housing
for himself and his family are already more than he can possibly
. take care of. He and his ancestors has never voted or ever had a
voice in the selection of governors or in the determination of
national policy. This only means that the common man in China
is customarily inactive in politics. ;,But is he by tradition and habit a
democrat, a man who respects other people's rights and who wants
his own rights respected by others, or is he by nature. a slave
or a dictator? Can he be induced or educated to be active in politics?
As raw material for democracy, are the Chinese good or bad?
There is no doubt about the answer to these questions. The com
mon man in China is a convinced individualist and resents govern
ment intereference or regimentation. He is at the same time a
reasonable being and is accustomed to talk things over with his
neighbors and ever ready to abide by the general will of the com
munity. For many centuries, he has handled local affairs in the
democratic spirit, though not through the same democratic form
of voting which the West has developed. The common man in China
can be educated to participate in modern democratic practices; the
speed of learning will be determined by the rate in the rise of his
standard of living.
The educated people in China all stand for democracy, al
though they may be divided in the interpretation of this word or
that and in the methods of its realizatio�. Among them are many
upright, patriotic, and progressive people. If they were organized,

47
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss10/1

50

Naval War College: December 1949 Full Issue

RESTRICTED
they could lead the nation towards the goal of economic and political
modernization.
When the First National Revolution took place in 1911 the
dominant thought of the intelligentsia in China was for liberal
parliamentary government as practiced in the United States and
. Western European countries.
Unfortunately, the First National Revolution only succeeded

nominally. Aiming at democracy, our revolutionary fathers actually
obtained anarchy and civil war and the rule of the most ignorant and
reactionary war lords. F:rom 1911 to 1925 we fell from the height
of a very brief happy period of political honeymoon into the depth
I

.

.

of fifteen years of utterdespair.

Before 1911 and in the early years of . the Republic,
there
'
· .
· ,
were a few voices warning. China, against the experiment of a
.
republican, democratic government. I might mention Dr. Good-

now, who had been Professor of Political Science in Columbia University and who later became President of John Hopkins University. In the early years of the Chinese Republic, Dr. Goodnow was
the constitutional adviser to the. Chinese Government. He pub-

lished a memorandum in 1912 or 1913 advocating constitutional
monarchy for China. I :might mention another foreign observer,
namely, Sir John Jordan, who, having been the British Minister to
China for many years, knew China ve:ry well. He too thought that
China was totally unprepared for an experiment in parliamentary
government.
Among the Chinese themselves there were outstanding
scholars who were skeptical about republicanism, not because they
did not appreciate the me:rit or worth of democracy but because

they felt that China was not ready for a republican form of govern
ment. The leader of this schoolof thought was the late Mt;; Liang
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Chi-Chao; He produced an historical statistical table showing in
each historical instance how civil war followed every change of
dynasty. He warned China that of all the ills of mankind, civil war
was the worst and he predicted that the overthrow of the Manchu

Dynasty and the establishment of a republic would again usher in
a long period of civil war.

In previous periods of history, China
lived in actual isolation from the rest of the world, and therefore,

civil war, though disastrous in its domestic consequences, had no
international effect. In modern times, Mr. Liang said, a long period
of civil war would afford foreign enemies the opportunity wh.ich
they desired.

I returned to China in 1923 after ten years of study abroad.

I was curious to know why the common people joined the armies
of the rival war lords. I found that the poverty of the masses drove
them into the armies. The pay of a soldier, meagre though it was,

served as adequate attraction.

What the war lords stood for and

fought for meant nothing to that common soldier.

to earn his upkeep.

He was there

At the time of my return to China, the war lord at the top

was General Tsao Kun.

He was most illiterate.

n was a great

puzzle to me how that man could achieve the power which he had.

One of my friends, much older than myself and better-informed,

told me the story.

General Tsao Kun, while inspecting some of

his troops, found a soldier weeping.

He stopped to question the

man and he was told that the man had just received news from

home about the extreme illness of his father. General Tsao im

mediately said to the man, "If your father is so ill, you must go

home.

I hope your father will recover.

If he does not recover,

here, take fifty dollars, buy him a good coffin and bury him in due

ceremony and then return ." By such means General Tsao won the
loyalty of his troops. The story, you can understand; was spread
most skilfully.

The appeal of the war lords of that day was not
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on any political principle. It was simply and entirely on grounds
of personal loyalty. And for some fifteen years China's armies were
.
built up and wars were fought on such feudal connections.
Then there came. the Russian Revolution. Here was a
.
country more - similar·. to . China th�n the United · States or Great
Britain. or France. Russia likewise had had centuries of a.bsolute
monarchy, a�d a large popu.lation with a high degree of illiteracy.

And. this country succeeded by establishing . a one-party. dictator,

ship. t'he.�xample of ll.ussia impressed.man;v people,· �mongwhom
,
was Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the father of the Chinese Rep�blic • He re
•
organized his party, the Kuomintang, along the lines of the Rus
sian Communist Party.. But his· education and early life had im

planted in him deep and sincere convictions on the desirability of

western liberal democracy.

He tried to square the: circle by adopt

ing Russian means to, what we might call, American aims. Iri other

words, he wanted ix>' establish a one-party dictatorship in China to
prepare the country for ultimate democracy.

elaborate program of preparation.

He worked out a11

Dr. Sun died before his party

came to power, but his successors in the party have always pro

claimed that they wished to carry out Dr.· Sun's. program. The op

ponents of the Koumintang hl:!,ve accused it of insincerity. Ol>jeGtive

ly, there is room for debate as to whether the Kuomintang has

donewell or not in preparing the country for democracy. It would

be totally untrue to assert that the Koumintang made no attempt&

in that direction. It would. be also untrue to claim Kuomintang's

attempts in democracy have been wen.:.considered.
some of these attempts.

Let me describe

At the beginning of the war with Japan, the Government

instituted the so-called Central People's Political Council. At first

the two hundred members were all appointed by the Government.

With each renewal of its membership a larger percentage was elect
ed until in the .end its membership was entirely elected. A similar
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institution vv:as organized in the provinces and districts, beginning
with Government appointees and ending in a total membership of
elected representatives.
The Central People's Political Council performed good serv
ice. The quality of its membership and its debates could be compared
favorably with parliaments in other countries. It made the Govern
ment conscious of strong currents of public opinion against which
it could not go. It also put up to the Government cet"tain standards
of administration· below which .it could not fall and retain the
confidence of the people. The provincial and district councils did
not do so well. As the percentage of elected representatives in
creased; the average quality declined. In some places, these councils
contributed to the inefficiency and corruption in local government.
In this respect, the experiment during war-time was not final.
Elections were hurried. Issues had not been thoroughly discussed
before the elections. The machinery of registration and polling was
at places cumbersome. The political groups did not have time for or
ganizaUon. These faults were partly due to war-time conditions
and partly due to the manipulations of the politician in control.
· The road to democracy in China has been and will. remain a
difficult one. The poverty of the people is a great obstacle. While
democracy is not a sure cure for China's �overty, the development
of free political life will be helpful in solving many of China's econ
omic problems. Furthermore, political democracy is an end in itself.
Nobody has claimed or can claim that democracy is only good for
the rich countries. I have no doubt that the Chinese people wish to
and can march towards democracy. I wish only to caution people
against trying to reach the goal in too much of a hurry. And I
.would emphasize that every improvement in the standard of living
of the people would automatically smooth the way ·to democratic
government in China.
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Let me summarize what I have said so far.

In the first

place, the problem of poverty is the basic problem in China. Second
ly, before the war, both the government and private agencies did

valuable constructive work, which pointed out the way to a solution

of the problem of poverty.

Thirdly, I have tried to show that com

munism with its chief emphasis on agrarian reform has adopted a

program of expropriation of the landlords, a program which is econ

omically unsound and inflicts great injustices on a large class of

land holders.

In the fourth place, I have tried to show that in spite

of deviations, the Chinese people will march towards democracy, the

chief obstacle of which is again. the problem of poverty.

Communism, instead of leading the people of China to a bet

ter life, will make China a satellite of the Soviet Union. It will ex
pose China to Russian political and economic exploitation.

As the

people find this out, and they are sure to find out in time, the op

position to communism will become stronger and stronger.

In the second place, the Communists have begun to impose

a totalitarian regime under which the individual is lost in the process
of public control and regimentation.

At the present moment they

have not yet consolidated their power, and therefore, have not at

tempted to impose absolute control on the life of the individual.

But as time goes on, there is no question that the communists will

tighten the screw of their one-party dictatorship. In. this respect

the Chinese Communists are as fanatical as their brethren in East
ern Europe.

The Communists talk a great deal about social justice and

a classless society.

I acknowledge there is social inequality in

China which should be removed, but long ago the founder of the

Chinese Republic pointed out that a class war in China was almost

meaningless.

For China suffered not so much· from inequality of

wealth as from

universal

poverty.

What there is. to re-distribute
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among the people is not wealth but poverty. For this reason Dr.
Sun warned the Chinese people against class war. He urged the

people to unite in a supreme effort at large-scale economic develop
ment based on the utilization of modern sciences and technology
and the capital and experience of the industrially more advanced
nations. There can be no doubt that the ideal set before the
Chinese people by Dr. Sun Yat Sen was both progressive and states
manlike.
Communist control of China will make cooperation between
China and the western democracies impossible. As a consequence, a
Communist China will not be able to utilize foreign capital and

foreign technical know-how, both of which are essential to a program of rapid economic development in China.
Another consequence of Communist control in China would
· be to turn China's back on democracy, sacrificing thereby some of
the finest fruits of modern civilization.
To sum up all what I have said: China's basic problem is
poverty and the chief solution is economic development. China's
immediate problem is the overthrow of the Chinese Communists.
Unless this is done, China will enter the dark ages, and, with
China, in the course of time, all Asia with its one billion popula

tion-half· of the human race!
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